Dr. José Antonio Hernández Company
Profesor-investigador
Ciudad de México

Es Doctor en Ciencia Política por la Universidad de Chicago y tiene una Licenciatura en Relaciones Internacionales por El Colegio de México. Ha impartido cursos sobre metodología de la investigación, política en América Latina y política comparada en la Universidad de Chicago y en el Tecnológico de Monterrey. Es miembro del Sistema Nacional de Investigadores del CONACyT nivel candidato. 

Los temas que investiga versan sobre partidos políticos, clientelismo, opinión pública y regímenes autoritarios. Ha sido invitado a presentar su investigación en congresos o talleres de investigación sobre partidos políticos en la Universidad de Harvard, Northwestern University y Universidad de Michigan. Su trabajo ha aparecido publicado en libros editados, revistas nacionales como Foro Internacional y revistas internacionales como la Latin American Research Review. 

PhD. en Ciencia Política por University of Chicago.

Licenciatura en Relaciones Internacionales por el Colegio de México.

Regímenes autoritarios y procesos de democratización

2015. "The Legacies of Authoritarianism: Opposition Parties and Their Electoral Strategies in Mexico", en Jose Galindo, ed., Mexico in Focus: Political, Environmental and Social Issues, New York: NOVA. 

2019. “Parallel authoritarian powers: an explanation of Mexico’s authoritarian regime breakdown.”, Democratization 26 (3): 465-483.

Partidos políticos

2011. "Las elecciones presidenciales de 2006 en México: ¿Fueron importantes las posturas sobre los distintos temas de políticas públicas?", Foro Internacional, 51 (3): 505-540. 

2018. “Los orígenes de los partidos de oposición mexicanos y sus estrategias de movilización del voto” en José Galindo, coord., México contemporáneo: aspectos económicos, políticos y sociales. Xalapa, VER: Universidad Veracruzana.

Economía política

2016. "The Political Economy of Social Spending by Local Government. A Study of the 3x1 Program in Mexico" (con A. Simpser, L. Duquette-Rury, J.F. Ibarra).

2019. “¿Sirve el clientelismo para movilizar al electorado? El caso neoleonés en las elecciones de 2018”, en Comisión Estatal Electoral Nuevo León, ed., Perfiles del electorado neolonés 2018. La ciudadanía ante el nuevo juego electoral, Monterrey, NL: CEENL, 2018.

2018. “Contextual Incentives are Not Enough: Clientelistic Capacity and the Politics of Enrollment in Mexico’s Seguro Popular”, Latin American Policy 9 (2): 304-330. (con D. Argente)

CONTEXTUAL INCENTIVES ARE NOT ENOUGH: CLIENTELISTIC CAPACITY AND THE POLITICS OF ENROLLMENT IN MEXICO’S SEGURO POPULAR

Recent work suggests that there is a close and positive relation between poverty, electoral competitiveness, and the development of clientelistic linkages among political parties and the electorate. The prevailing argument is that high levels of electoral competitiveness in poor districts incentivize all parties competing there to buy votes. This article suggests that, even when facing these contextual incentives, parties will not be able to engage in clientelistic relations with voters unless they have the organizational ability to do so. We call this ability ‘clientelistic capacity’ and develop an argument to explain its variation among Mexico’s three main parties. We test our claims using a regression discontinuity design to estimate the effect of a party in municipal government on enrollment in Seguro Popular, a public program targeted to the poor. We demonstrate that parties with clientelistic capacity enroll more persons in the program.

PARALLEL AUTHORITARIAN POWERS: AN EXPLANATION OF MEXICO’S AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN

Many scholars suggest that dominant parties enhance authoritarian regime resiliency by regularizing and directing the distribution of spoils, careers, and policy among members of the authoritarian coalition. This article challenges this assertion by providing a novel mechanism to explain why, under stress, some dominant party regimes are more likely to break down than others. The argument posits that an autocracy’s capacity to fend off systemic crises increases when elites who control the power to make decisions locate themselves in the same organization (for example, the military, the bureaucracy, a political party) as elites in charge of implementing these decisions. If elites of these types locate in different organizations (what I refer to as a “parallel power” arrangement), in the face of systemic adversities elite collective action suffers and, consequently, regime resiliency decreases. I illustrate the applicability of the argument in the case of Mexico’s party-based autocracy. The stability of this regime was fatally damaged when, in the presence of systemic challenges in the 1980s and 1990s, the state’s bureaucracy – in charge of making decisions – decided to enact economic and electoral policies against the wishes of the elites in the dominant party, who were in charge of implementing many of these decisions.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOCIAL SPENDING BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF THE 3×1 PROGRAM IN MEXICO

Social spending by central governments in Latin America has, in recent decades, become increasingly insulated from political manipulation. Focusing on the 3×1 Program in Mexico in 2002–2007, we show that social spending by local government is, in contrast, highly politicized. The 3×1 Program funds municipal public works, with each level of government—municipal, state, and central—matching collective remittances. Our analysis shows that 3×1 municipal spending is shaped by political criteria. First, municipalities time disbursements according to the electoral cycle. Second, when matching collective remittances, municipalities protect salaries of personnel, instead adjusting budget items that are less visible to the public, such as debt. Third, municipalities spend more on 3×1 projects when their partisanship matches that of the state government. Beyond the 3×1 Program, our findings highlight the considerable influence that increasing political and economic decentralization can have on local government incentives and spending choices, in Mexico and beyond. Co-autores: Alberto Simpser, Lauren Duquette-Rury, José Antonio Hernández Company y Juan Fernando Ibarra.